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21. INTRODUCTION
Disclosure of information concerning strategy, busi-
ness models, critical success factors, risk factors and 
value drivers in general has gained importance in recent 
years. Both policy makers and academics have argued 
that the demand for external communication of new 
types of value drivers is rising as companies increas-
ingly base their competitive strengths and thus the 
value of the company on know-how, patents, skilled 
employees and other intangibles.
In parallel with the focus on disclosure of value driv-
ers, the concept of business models has gained popu-
larity. However, business models in terms of “ways 
of doing business” have always existed. The business 
model reflects the way of competing of the specific 
company, whether it concerns being unique or being 
the most cost-efficient company in the industry. The 
supply of information on the value creating processes 
and value drivers of firms has actually been increas-
ing in various reporting media such as annual reports, 
IPO prospectuses and the reports of financial analysts. 
Furthermore, some firms, especially in the Nordic coun-
tries, have started developing Intellectual Capital (IC) 
reports that communicate how knowledge resources 
are managed in the firms within a strategic framework, 
and new models for reporting on stakeholder value cre-
ation and CSR are gradually emerging. Despite this, an 
explicit recognition of value creation as a central part of 
a business model is generally lacking in this literature.
It is also noticeable that even though disclosure of 
information from companies has been increasing, 
there are no clear signs that the particular information 
demands of investors and analysts have been met. The 
paradox is therefore that while there are well-devel-
oped arguments for disclosure and evidence indicates 
that companies are disclosing more and more informa-
tion, there are also indications that disclosure quality 
is insufficient at the present. This leads us to consider 
whether we are facing a reporting gap, or rather an 
understanding gap. This is where the business model 
can be applied. 
There is a multitude of evidence that the nature of the 
business environment is changing. Among the factors 
that drive this development are the globalization of 
markets, greater mobility of the workforce as well as 
monetary and physical goods and the application of 
information technology and technology in general. As 
the above factors and greater integration of capital 
markets cause changes in the nature of value crea-
tion, and new competitive elements gain importance, 
new types of disclosure and reporting that are argued 
to be so vital for conveying transparent pictures of the 
corporate well-being are unfortunately not without 
problems, as these types of information are somewhat 
more complex than traditional financial information. 
It could very well be a problem that the capital 
market agents simply do not understand non-ac-
counting information. Perhaps business models en-
able the creation of a comprehensive and more correct 
set of non-financial value drivers of the company and 
are therefore a useful reference model for disclosure. 
In the near future, western-society citizens will be 
questioning not just the future of the financial sector 
of the western world, but also the sustainability of the 
industrialized western society as a whole. 
On the one hand, pressure from under-burdened west-
ern society taxpayers (voters) who crave an average 
working week of 35-37 hours and retirement 40-50 
years prior to their death will be on the rise. On the 
other hand, eager hardworking Asian and Indian 
consumers with surprisingly well-educated workforces 
will lead us to be questioning our chances of economic 
survival in a truly globalized world all throughout 2012. 
One possible answer to this problem is that western 
societies to a greater extent need to rely on human 
capital in the quest for private sector value creation, 
innovation and competitiveness. However, human 
capital will not make the difference alone. Only when 
complemented by triple-helix based innovation struc-
tures, creativity and unique business models that com-
mercialize innovation and human capital will this be an 
avenue to future sustainability.  
It is in this connection that the financial sector needs 
to start understanding new types of business models 
and hence also new types of information. Environ-
mental, Social and Governance (ESG) information is a 
3good example. It is today solely used by the buy- and 
sell-side in ex post audit society screening manner. We 
need to ambitiously pursue ex ante screening as a first 
step and then quickly move to actual active use of ESG 
information and information pertaining to sources of 
value creation in investment decisions. We should be 
hoping to see the first modules on analyzing business 
models and ESG information on post-graduate, MBA 
and CFA levels soon. At least for the sake of sustaining 
western society as we know it, we hope so!
2. INFORMATION NEEDS OF 
INVESTORS AND ANALYSTS 
While disclosure of information has been increasing, 
there are no clear signs that investors and analysts’ 
demand for information has been met. Eccles et al. 
(2001, 189) conclude that managers “genuinely believe 
they try hard to give the market the information it 
wants. But most analysts and investors believe man-
agers could try harder”. Literature is abundant with 
well-developed arguments for better disclosure, and 
empirical studies document that improved disclosure 
is related to e.g. increased analyst interest in the firm, 
lower cost-of-capital and decreased bid-ask spreads. 
Back in the 1990’s various studies of investors and 
analysts’ request for information indicated a substan-
tial difference between the type of information found 
in company annual reports and the type of informa-
tion demanded by the market, and more recent stud-
ies show only limited improvements with respect to 
disclosure practises in the firms. 
Companies have clearly become aware of the impor-
tance of managing their external communication 
systematically, and the importance of investor 
relations is increasing. Also, investors and analysts are 
becoming more aware of the importance of factors not 
included in the financial statement, although tradi-
tional financial information is still considered to be of 
greatest importance. The general tendency emerging 
both from surveys of information needs and norma-
tive reports is that the capital market actors request 
more reliable information on e.g. managerial qualities, 
expertise, experience and integrity, customer relations 
and personnel competencies since these factors are 
considered important for the ability of the company to 
generate value. 
Much of this information is, however, too complicat-
ed to summarise e.g. in annual reports. Furthermore, 
experiences from the management literature with 
respect to new strategic reporting models as for 
instance the balanced scorecard approach or intellec-
tual capital reports show that it is just as complicated 
for management to define what factors are actually 
the few most important drivers of future performance, 
as it is for external stakeholders to understand such 
information when it is disclosed. 
Related to this a recent report (KPMG 2003) based on 
answers from a sample of non-executive directors in 
the U.K indicated that while 94% of the respondents 
considered themselves to have considerable know-
ledge of financial performance measures, only 60% 
considered themselves sufficiently knowledgeable 
with regard to non-financial measures such as critical 
success factors, strategy etc. 
Major questions regarding how this information should 
be defined, how it should be structured, and how it 
should be communicated to the market still remain. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of the capital 
market, similar questions arise: 
•	 How should the information be used?
•	 How can it be trusted?
•	 How should it supplement traditional financial in-
formation? 
•	 What overall framework can support the evalua-
tion of the firm’s strategy?
3. BACKGROUND ON THE MARKET 
FOR INFORMATION 
According to Ball (1996, 11), the theory of efficient 
markets is an imperfect and limited way of viewing 
capital markets as the prescriptive theories of finance 
4on which the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is based, 
widely ignores the human nature of the participants 
that constitute the capital market and especially the 
three groups of opinion-formers: 
•	 Company management 
•	 Sell-side analysts
•	 The fund management function 
In order to understand the functioning of the capital 
market correctly, we must make a distinction between 
the market for exchange and the market for infor-
mation (see figure 1). This distinction was first intro-
duced by Gonedes (1976), who argued that many of the 
assertions of traditional finance theory were mislead-
ing, because they did not deal with the relevant part 
of the capital market, i.e. the market for information. 
By relevant, Gonedes (1976) meant those groups of 
actors that were the major opinion-makers with 
respect to valuation, and he, furthermore, argued that 
“failure to explicitly consider the market for informa-
tion may induce unwarranted inferences about the 
capital market” (1976, 628).
Barker (1997), depicting the relationships between 
companies, analysts and fund managers, argues that 
there are two ‘information markets’ co-existing in 
the market for information, namely the market for 
financial reporting and the market for financial analy-
sis. In his subsequent study, Barker (1998) concludes 
that the market for financial reporting is of consider-
ably greater importance than the market for financial 
analysis. With respect to the market for financial report-
ing, other disclosures from the company than merely 
the annual report must also be considered, e.g. press 
releases, earnings announcements and conference 
calls. The market for corporate disclosure might there-
fore be a better description. The market for financial 
analysis can be perceived almost as an intermediary 
function, however not neglecting that investors too 
receive information directly from the company itself.
Figure 1: The market for information
5Barker (1998) analyzes the economic incentives with 
respect to information flows between these actors, 
arguing that these incentives must in some manner 
also reflect the tasks carried out. Barker (1998, 16) finds 
similar economic incentives between management and 
fund managers, “both having a similar time horizon 
on a benchmark of relative share price performance, 
and both take great care to avoid negative surprises”. 
Barker also concludes that because of the economic 
incentives connected with the turnover-based 
commission income of the analysts, the analysts in 
contrast favour share price volatility rather than sta-
bility (Barker 1998, 16). Despite the fact that fund 
managers consider financial reporting and formal 
meetings with company management more impor-
tant than the analysts, their role in the market for in-
formation is seen as a “news agency and a source of 
valuation benchmarks” (Barker 1998, 16). 
Holland & Johanson (2003) problematize the abilities of 
the market for information participants to incorporate 
new types of information on e.g. intellectual capital 
and the value creation process of companies into valu-
ations. They argue that because the fund management 
and analyst functions have difficulties understanding 
even their own value creation process and intellec-
tual capital, then how can they be expected to under-
stand those of the companies they are analyzing and 
investing in (Holland & Johanson 2003)? Furthermore, 
Holland & Johanson (2003) argue that ambivalence 
towards using new types of information is attributable 
to the institutionalized nature and culture of these 
actors. This is accentuated by Ikäheimo (1996, 30), who 
argues that “[t]he value of a share is derived from a 
consensus based on the institutionalized conception of 
how the value of the company should be perceived”. 
The statements above bring relish to a dilemma and 
unexplored avenue in relation to the decision-making 
of the market for information participants. To mini-
mize uncertainty and risks in investments, market for 
information participants and other actors in the capital 
market wish to base their decisions on full informa-
tion, i.e. from a rational, consequential set. However, 
as indicated above, they do not understand new types 
of information otherwise regarded as highly value 
relevant. Therefore, although they want their decisions 
to look consequential, they are in fact characterized by 
the logic of appropriateness. Furthermore, as practices 
and rules-of-thumb to incorporate and understand 
new types of information are not presently institution-
alized, the market for information participants face 
grave difficulties when packing and unpacking such 
disclosures. 
Holland has conducted a number of studies in relation 
to the market for information participants and the 
dissemination of voluntary information between them. 
Holland (1998) concludes that private information 
disclosed to institutional shareholders is a significant 
part of a larger corporate decision concerning public 
versus private voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, Hol-
land & Doran (1998) have examined financial institu-
tions’ application of private information channels, 
finding that these invested much time and effort in 
cultivating relationships in order to gain an information 
edge over the market.
In a later study, Holland (2002a) has found that the 
limitations of finance theory and the limitations of 
corporate disclosures and other public domain 
information sources cause uncertainty in stock selec-
tion and in asset allocation decisions for fund man-
agers. Finally, Holland (2004) argues that the funda-
mental mosaic is the cornerstone of communication 
between the ‘market for information’s’ participants. 
According to Holland (2004, 67), the fundamental mo-
saic: “provides a coherent means to tie together this 
information in a broader picture and to assess the im-
pact on corporate valuations and it provides a means to 
check corporate promises against reality”. 
In 2009 John Holland refines his thoughts on the 
mosaic of information even further in his paper “Look-
ing behind the veil”: invisible corporate intangibles, 
stories, structure and the contextual information con-
tent of disclosure. Here he depicts three archetypes of 
value creation processes used for telling the business 
model story, namely 1) hierarchical (from top manage-
ment), 2) horizontal (operational value creation), and 3) 
network (or alliances and strategic partnerships). 
Holland explains: “The hierarchical aspect of the corpo-
rate value creation story concerned common structures 
and categories of strategic drivers across companies. 
The hierarchical narrative concerned the story of the 
6board, its directors, and board committees as the pri-
mary internal corporate governance mechanisms. This 
narrative explained how the board chose top-manage-
ment and incentives schemes, how top-management 
in turn developed and implemented a coherent strat-
egy and how this was monitored by the board. … The 
hierarchical narrative revealed top-down drivers of the 
value creation process. These primary drivers included 
top management qualities, coherence and credibility 
of strategy, management remuneration schemes, and 
corporate performance systems based on shareholder 
value.” 
Further, Holland writes that: “Each case company also 
articulated a concept or idea of its ‘horizontal’ or opera-
tional value creation process consisting of input sourc-
ing decisions, transformation decisions and processes, 
and output decisions. This value creation process was 
normally conducted at middle management and em-
ployee operational levels.  It was often the critical part 
of the corporate value creation story showing how a 
case company differentiated its economic transfor-
mation processes from those of its competitors in the 
same sector. … The network value creation narrative 
sought to explain how the company sought to create 
many shared knowledge intensive competences at the 
boundary of the company. This normally involved the 
sharing both of tangible and intangible value drivers via 
supply, production and marketing alliances at various 
points in the corporate horizontal value creation pro-
cess. It often involved sharing of unique or otherwise 
unobtainable intangibles.” 
Finally, Holland concludes that the business model 
narrative, or strategic story, normally connected many 
of the key elements in the value creation process. 
This was communicated externally to investors via a 
narrative connecting hierarchical, horizontal, and 
network value creation processes and the concept 
of an intangible, and its relative ranking, was given 
additional meaning by being placed and linked with-
in the larger value creation story during the private 
question and answer sessions. This provided evidence 
and gave credibility to both the story and the relative 
ranking of the unobservable intangible factor. The 
combination of the narrative about the three value 
creation processes, the use of benchmark indicators or 
measures, their placing and linking within the story, all 
helped case companies provide the required ‘full story’ 
or ‘big picture’ to investors.
4. GAINING A COMPETITIVE 
EDGE IN THE MARKET FOR 
INFORMATION
There is an intricate and rather delicate relationship 
between analysts, investors and management, which 
at the same time is located in an extremely competi-
tive context (Fogarty & Rogers 2005). It is an environ-
ment of secrecy amongst the competing analysts, who 
all seek to gain some sort of competitive advantage 
in relation to their peers. The notion of having been or 
being able to gain a competitive edge over the market 
can mean a variety of things. For the financial analyst, 
there are basically three ways to do this; it can e.g. 
pertain to having information that others do not have 
access to, having a unique perspective, or simply to 
having better analytical skills.
Firstly, possessing a piece of information about a 
firm that none of the competitors have, is an obvious 
competitive advantage. As there are strict rules and 
regulations with respect to having price sensitive 
insider information, this sort of competitive edge 
is typically mobilized through expert contacts, e.g. 
specialists in the specific field of a specific company or 
through collaboration across offices within the larger 
investment banks. In this manner, having an informa-
tion edge is more likely to mean having a more detailed 
account of existing information, rather than new infor-
mation that nobody else has.
In this respect, having a good relationship with 
company management teams and investor relations 
departments is a key to gaining a competitive edge, as 
more details on specific elements of the firm (Barker 
1998, 16) or e.g. an alternative management per-
spective on a piece of information might be shared 
through private dialogue. According to Francis & Phil-
brick (1993), the analyst relies on his relationships with 
corporate executives for information and analysis 
that is not widely disseminated. Such relationships, 
which may be conducted through visits to corporate 
headquarters, telephone calls with senior execu-
tives, or in group settings, are crucial to the analyst in 
7establishing his claim to expertise (Philips & Zucker-
man 2001, 393), i.e. competitive edge. 
Also in relation to new information, the ability to be 
quicker to the market than competitors with newly 
disclosed information, e.g. in connection with earnings 
announcements, is another important competitive 
advantage. Typically, trading is stopped for 2 minutes 
around an earnings announcement. Within this inter-
val the analyst must download and skim the report 
and be able to point out the direction in comparison to 
previous expectations to the sales-desk. For some ana-
lysts this is a crucial part of their job, while others do 
not see their value adding tasks in this situation. With 
respect to analyzing the company, having a competitive 
edge can either come through being the fastest, e.g. in 
connection with earnings announcements, or having 
the best analytical capabilities. 
A key competitive edge, an analytical edge, is being 
the best at interpreting existing information. Frankel 
et al. (2002) find that analyst research helps prices 
reflect information about a security’s fundamentals. This 
indicates that while the analysts’ role may restrict 
itself to merely pre-announcing earnings numbers 
in connection with annual earnings announcements 
etc., their real value-adding activities relate to the 
more fundamental research and understanding of the 
company value creation logic, strategy etc. 
Typically, the analysts create informativeness in 
comparison to the fund managers themselves and 
thus justify their existence by specializing by industry 
(Al-Debie & Walker 1999, 262) and by utilizing syner-
gies between research functions within the investment 
bank. In relation to this, Desai, Liang & Singh (2000) 
find that stocks recommended by analysts follow-
ing a single industry outperform those recommended 
by analysts following multiple industries. Hence, also 
the precision of their forecasts, which is a key point on 
which they are evaluated by investors, is a competitive 
edge. 
Analysts seem to have their raison d´être where 
complexity is greatest. However, there is also evi-
dence that even analysts have difficulties in making 
forecasts in certain situations, e.g. where knowledge-
resources constitute a major part of the company 
value (Lee 2001), difficulties that could pertain to the 
inadequate applicability of conventional measurement 
and valuation approaches for such purposes (Lee 2001, 
Garcia-Ayuso 2003). Plumlee (2003) finds that infor-
mation complexity imposes sufficient costs even on 
expert users and reduces their use hereof. Therefore, 
analysts’ abilities to incorporate complex information 
in their analyses are a decreasing function of complex-
ity and information processing costs. For instance, 
Bukh (2003, 53) argues that disclosing intellectual cap-
ital indicators without disclosing the business model 
that explains their interconnectedness leaves the 
analysts to do all the interpretation; something which 
they are not capable of. Garcia-Ayuso (2003, pp 60-61) 
questions the credibility of analyst recommenda-
tions in this light, vindicating for a bounded rationality 
perspective on analysts’ cognitive abilities.
Investors and companies rank analysts differently, and 
even though some analysts are not the most accurate, 
they can still have the highest rating because their 
competitive edge comes from their ability to provide 
e.g. a new perspective on the firm (Beunza & Garud 
2004, 14). Therefore, having a perspective edge, also 
termed ‘a unique case’, is a source of competitive edge. 
Beunza & Garud (2004) conceive analysts as makers 
of calculative frames. Analysts calculate, but they do 
so within a framework. According to Beunza & Garud 
(2004), analysts may appear to conform, but they also 
deviate from the pack to generate original perspectives 
on the value of a security, and, occasionally, displace 
prevailing frames.
The analysts rely on the factors mentioned above to 
gain an advantageous standing in the eyes of the 
investors, who then, in turn, trade through the 
analysts’ investment banks and furthermore par-
ticipate in rating the analysts among one another 
(Phillips & Zuckerman 2001). Typically, analyst rat-
ings are a proxy for how much of their trading volume 
the investors will place at the respective investment 
banks, and as trading volume is what pays for the 
analyst services provided, the analysts live and die 
by their rating; hence the degree of competitiveness 
between analysts. Because analysts are dependent 
upon their customers, the investors, for their survival, 
it is appropriate to consider analyst reports as proxies 
for investors’ information demands.
8From the analyst point of view, indicators disclosed 
in the annual report or in a supplementary report only 
constitute one part, maybe even an inferior part, of 
the information needed to make recommendations 
to clients, because they are in a privileged position to 
“get more information – and sooner – than all except 
the very largest investors” (Eccles et al. 2001, 274). It 
might be that the information has value relevance, 
but the analysts have already a much more detailed 
understanding about e.g. the research and develop-
ment activities, than that which can be gained from 
reading about the aggregated research and develop-
ment expenses. 
Taking the above description of the different angles 
towards gaining competitive advantage as the point 
of departure, let us briefly reflect upon how different 
‘types’ of analysts position themselves accordingly 
within the market for financial analysis. Analysts are 
not a homogenous group of people (cf. Day 1986), 
although it has been suggested that their behaviour 
and understanding of social norms are indeed extreme-
ly similar (cf. Norberg 2001, Holland & Johanson 2003). 
In the following, let us distinguish between two types 
of analysts, namely the small cluster and the large 
cluster analysts, where cluster refers to the amount 
of companies they actively follow on a daily basis. The 
large cluster analysts typically focus on 10-20 differ-
ent companies, whereas the small cluster analysts 
concentrate on 4-8 companies. 
There are large discrepancies between their job descrip-
tions, i.e. their client contact activities, and also with 
respect to the customer segments that they serve, 
i.e. private or institutional investors. Generally, the 
large cluster analysts have more and smaller clients, 
while the small cluster analysts generally serve fewer 
and larger institutional clients. Also, the large cluster 
analysts have a closer connection with the traders of 
their respective investment banks – some of them 
even taking orders from clients. 
These differences also have an effect on the type 
and detail of the research that they conduct and the 
thoroughness of the analyst reports in which they 
disseminate their results. Like with the analysts, there 
are also two types of analyst reports; the scheduled or 
earnings analyst report, and the fundamental analyst 
report, where fundamental analysis can be described as 
determining the value of corporate securities by a care-
ful examination of key value drivers such as earnings, 
risk, growth and competitive position (Lev & Thiaga-
rajan 1993, 190). Not all analysts conduct the so-called 
fundamental analyses, as it is not a part of their job 
descriptions. This typically relates to the type of analyst 
in question. This will be discussed further in connection 
with evidence provided in the empirical analysis below. 
As this paper focuses on gaining knowledge about how 
corporate reporting can be enhanced by investigating 
the types of information analysts consider important 
in their fundamental research, the point of departure 
for the empirical analysis will be fundamental analyst 
reports.
Studying financial data in relation to analysts’ deci-
sion-making processes, Gniewosz (1990, 227) finds 
that the annual report is still considered the most 
important source of information (see also Brown 1997), 
although it is seen as having mainly a confirmatory 
function, rather than a primary information function, 
and a disciplinary effect on other corporate disclo-
sure media (Christensen 2003). A number of studies 
have likewise examined the analysts’ decision-making 
processes (cf. Schipper 1991) e.g. in connection with 
screening of prospective investments (Bouwman et 
al. 1987; Bouwman et al. 1995). A number of different 
foci have been uncovered, for example how analysts’ 
decisions are products of group environments (Francis 
& Philbrick 1993), the identification of the most widely 
used valuation practices among analysts (Block 1999, 
91; Plenborg 2002), and the uncovering of the various 
stages in the valuation process (Gniewosz 1990, Mour-
itsen et al. 2002a).
There seems to be some evidence pointing towards a 
context-specific use of valuation metrics. It has been 
indicated that fundamental strategic analysis is more 
appropriate for valuing younger firms but also more 
specifically new ventures, while the more capital-based 
valuation metrics, such as discounted cash-flow and 
Price/Earnings, are more aptly applied to mature firms.
 
Confirming the greater difficulties of valuating rela-
tively new investment objects (the capital market’s 
version of the company), be they companies, new ven-
tures or spin-off projects, and also investment objects 
9characterized by consisting to a great extent of in-
tangible assets, Mouritsen et al. (2002a) depict a 
seven-stage model whereby the valuation process of 
such “businesses” can take place. In relation to this 
challenge, Hägglund (2001) describes more closely how 
investors and analysts work together in this process. 
Hägglund’s research, focusing on the conceptualiza-
tion of the company rather than its value, illustrates 
the complexity of the flow of funds to companies 
through the capital market and that the process also 
encompasses social and behavioural aspects.
Luehrman (1997) states that traditional valuation 
approaches may have become obsolete in the light of 
the recent changes in the nature of value creation from 
tangible to being predominately intangible of nature. 
However, the market for information participants still 
need relevant information in order to enable correct 
and accurate valuations of the firms, i.e. to get as close 
to intrinsic value as possible. On the basis of these 
facts, Mouritsen et al. (2001) suggest that three differ-
ent types of capital must be evaluated in order to get a 
correct picture of the value of the company. These are 
social capital, financial capital and “wise” capital, the 
latter including factors such as strategic knowledge 
and knowledge on organization and control. 
5. INFORMATION TRIGGER-POINTS 
FOR INVESTORS
Events that cause significant movements in the stock 
price are called triggers. The term trigger is used in 
relation to initiating research and valuation of the 
company. Applying analyst terminology, trigger points 
are typically fundamental changes that alter the val-
ue of the company, e.g. changes to growth and value 
drivers or changes in the macroeconomic environment. 
In a sense, triggers represent possibilities for earnings 
surprises. 
Possible triggers, points for stock price movement, and 
fundamental analysis could be (this is not necessarily 
an exhaustive list): 
•	 The announcement of mergers & acquisitions
•	 Spin-off of existing operations into a new entity
•	 Entering into new geographical markets with 
existing product-base
•	 Introduction of new products to existing markets
•	 Significant cost-cutting initiations
•	 Change of strategic focus, e.g. from being low-cost 
producer to producing high quality products
•	 Changes in the top management team
•	 Announcement of passed stage gates in the R&D 
pipeline for future products
•	 Announcement of significant collaborative agree-
ments in the value chain
Triggers such as those listed above do not represent 
information that can be put directly into an applied 
technical valuation model. Rather they represent key 
points in relation to the actors’ fundamental mosaic. 
The perception of company value is determined by 
the realization of strategic options and future stra-
tegic choices made by company management. In this 
respect, e.g. quality of management, track record, 
strategic focus etc. become crucial for estimating the 
future performance of the company. The mosaic is a 
part of this understanding of how the fundamentals of 
the company will perform beyond the reach of certain 
cash flow estimates. Therefore, unpacking the black-
box of the capital market actors’ fundamental mo-
saic and its relationship to stock price is an important 
aspect to investigate. 
The fundamental mosaic is the image of the company 
which each market for information participant has. 
Skubic & McGoun (2000, 17) suggest that communi-
cation of the corporate ‘image’, i.e. the fundamental 
mosaic, is necessary to attract attention to the com-
pany, i.e. increase analyst following (Wyatt & Wong 
2002), enhance the credibility of disclosures, and 
facilitate the market for information participants’ 
interpretation, because investment decisions are 
based on images rather than propositions. In essence, 
Skubic & McGoun (2000) here argue that a consequen-
tial understanding of the company is not what actually 
takes place. Rather, an appropriate representation of 
the company, like in the concept of business models 
is the basis for conceptualization and communication. 
6. ANALYSTS AS INFOMEDIARIES
The analysts, serving as information intermediar-
ies between companies and investors, take multiple 
sources of information into account in their recom-
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mendations (Barron et al. 2002). This means that the 
analysts’ reports, recommendations, and analyses are 
a separate ‘secondary’ source of information for the 
fund management function (Caramanolis-Cötelli et al. 
1999; Holland & Johansen 2003, 467), and the analysts 
themselves act as sparring partners for the investors. 
Research confirms that investors react to e.g. financial 
analysts’ research reports (Hirst, Koonce & Simko 1995), 
and also brokerage analysts’ recommendations have 
investment value (Womack 1996), although Krishnan 
& Booker (2002) only find analyst recommendations to 
reduce investors’ disposition errors in cases where they 
are supported by additional information in the form of 
a report. 
There has been a lot of talk in recent years of the need 
to promote greater transparency in the communication 
from companies to the capital markets. Transparency 
is in the eyes of the beholder and is not equivalent to 
information availability or an objective condition 
to which organizations need to adapt. Therefore 
transparency is an outcome of internal and external 
stakeholders’, i.e. company management and capi-
tal market agents, agreements on which information 
should be disclosed, i.e. a common conceptualization 
of the company business model. 
Communication is often associated with information, 
the rationale being that a demand for more or bet-
ter communication simply means more information. 
In the light of bounded rationality this becomes a 
problem, as external audiences have both limited 
access to information and limited information process-
ing capacity. Equating communication to information 
is like presuming that messages are simply transferred 
from a sender to a receiver in accordance with the 
intentions of the former.
Communication between company management and 
analysts and investors can take place through a number 
of different information channels. Such disclosures can 
be conveyed through e.g. analyst meetings or open and 
closed conference calls. Private channels are found to 
be an important medium for disclosing supplementary 
information about the company. Research confirms 
that the financial report still is the most important 
information source to users of company reporting, re-
gardless of their status as professional or private users. 
Lee & Tweedie’s twin studies (1977, 1981) examined first 
the private investors’ and secondly the institutional 
investors’ perceptions of the usefulness of the corpo-
rate report. They argue that even though there seems 
to be information symmetry between the investor 
groups, meaning that private investors get the same 
information as the large institutional investors, there 
is to a great extent an understanding asymmetry. They 
imply that financial statements are far too complex for 
ordinary investors to understand them (Lee & Tweedie 
1977, 27). 
7. TRANSLATED TO THE REAL 
WORLD CONTEXT THIS MEANS…
In the above sections we have reviewed a lot of litera-
ture on the roles of the actors in the market for infor-
mation and the information needs of these people. Be-
low we will translate this into some pragmatic advice 
for students, young entrepreneurs and small compa-
nies wishing to enhance their communication with the 
financial sector in general. 
It may seem as if there is a world of difference between 
the needs and desires of well-paid financial analysts 
and institutional investors in well-established capi-
tal markets with billion-USD turnovers and the young 
entrepreneur starting his own company, and looking 
for a few lousy bucks to sustain his ideas for another 
6-12 months. Yes there is in some sense a world of 
difference, but the decision-makers are much the 
same, and their line of thinking is exactly the same. 
For small-company investors (SC investors), wheth-
er they are business angels, pre-seed funders, seed 
capital providers, venture capitalists, private equity 
funds or other, investing is about taking a risk and 
being rewarded for this. Here information plays a key 
role, as information minimizes the perceived risk of 
making an investment. Transparency reduces un-
certainty in the sense of providing a foundation for 
predicting future profits. However, information can of 
course create uncertainty, even if it is “good” informa-
tion. For example if the information gives rise to sev-
eral possible scenarios for the company.
Generally speaking, the role of the business model is in 
discussing and visualizing the ambitions of the compa-
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ny, e.g. is it a strong proposition, what are the scaling 
possibilities, can the company go global?
7.1 What does the small-company investor look 
for?
A SC-investor typically goes through an initial screen-
ing process of the companies that wish to engage in 
an investment partnership or sale. This initial screen-
ing process is sometimes quite rigorous, in other 
instances it is a question of assessing whether the SC-
investor has knowledge of the proposed business area 
and competences to lift the business to another level, 
or whether they believe in the market the business is 
trying to address. 
Surviving the initial screening typically means getting 
to present the company to the SC-investor board. Here 
one may typically expect a 30 minute session in front 
of the board where you should be talking for approxi-
mately 15-17 minutes and leave room for questions 
afterwards. In reality, the entrepreneur, or should we 
call him capital-seeker, needs to deliver his punch lines 
within the first 2 minutes. There exist numerous guides 
on which “business plan” information the entrepreneur 
should submit to SC-investors. The suggestion here is 
to construct 2 documents: 1) A report in a text format, 
and 2) A power-point presentation. Both could/should 
apply the following structure: 
Table 1: SC-investor screening
FRONT PAGE » INCLUDING COMPANY NAME AND CONTACT INFORMATION
Executive summary » A teaser summing the key points of the presentation
» Which market is being addressed and how?
» Market growth scenarios, quantified
» Which user needs are being addressed?
» What is the value of meeting these needs seen from the user?
» How does your product/service meet these needs?
» How much capital is needed?
» When will we see a ROI?
» What is the exit-plan?
The management team » Who is involved and what are their competences? 
» What are the teams management skills?
» What is the track record of this management team?
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The Business model » Which value creation proposition are we trying to sell to our customers and the 
users of our products?
» Which connections are we trying to optimize through the value creation of the 
company?
» Are there any critical connections between the different phases of value cre-
ation undertaken?
» Describe the activities set in motion in order to develop the company 
» Enlighten these activities through relevant performance measures
» Which resources, systems and competences must be attained in order to be 
able to mobilize our strategy?
» What do we do in relation to ensuring access to and developing the necessary 
competences?
» Can we measure the effects of our striving to become better, more innovative 
or more efficient, other than the bottom line? 
Market analysis » A precise description of the market
» What is the size of the market?
» Market growth scenarios, quantified
» What drives this market and what is the elasticity on it?
» Which customer segments exist and how are they addressed (differently)?
» Documentation!
Competitor analysis » Who are the key competitors? 
» Describe the competitors you are going head to head with
» Do a SWOT analysis on these
» In which way is the product/service of the company unique in comparison to 
major competitors?
» What are the key competitors’ product/market strategies?
Product description » Describe the product so that its properties are understandable to anyone
Patents » Are there any patents, patents pending or patenting possibilities? 
» What is the patenting strategy? 
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Go-to-market strategy » Describe how the product will be launched to the market? 
» Which distribution channels will be used?
» Are there any bottlenecks or initial investments?
» Who are the key decision makers to address?  
Risks » Which risks can undermine the success of the chosen business model?
» What can we do to control and minimize these?
Key economic ratios » Forecast expected revenues and costs
» Be explicit about the prerequisites for these forecasts
» Indicate the sensitivities of these prerequisites
» Give a base case, best case and worst case scenario
The investor role and 
exit-plan
» Which role do you expect the SC-investor to play in your company? 
» Which competences and network do you wish to gain access to from your 
SC-investor?
» How do you see the SC-investor filling out this role? 
» Which ownership balance do you see? 
» When do you expect an exit and to which kind of investor?
» What is your expected exit-price at this point in time?
Milestones » Describe milestones that the company has already reached, like e.g. proof of 
concept, previous investments
» Describe future milestones for the company and which impact they will have
Company description » Provide a brief description of the company, including history, vision, mission 
and strategy
» Domicile
» Communication and organization
» Describe key IT systems in place
» Describe the management control system
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The structure outlined above follows most suggestions 
and guidelines in this field, but distinguishes itself by 
being more explicit about the business model. Ide-
ally, the business model should play a larger and more 
central role in this process, but we do not feel that 
the SC-investor community is ready yet. They need 
time to understand the concept properly and therefore 
they still rely on a traditional business plan, sensitivity 
analysis and SWOT analysis structure. 
7.2 The 60 second elevator-pitch
When you have prepared your investor pitch 
according to the structure in the section above, you 
should also work on delivering your “Elevator Pitch”. 
The “Elevator Pitch” must be landed in under 60 
seconds and it must answer the following six questions: 
1. What is your product or service? Briefly describe 
what you sell. Do not go into excruciating details.   
2. Who is your market? Briefly discuss to whom you 
are selling the product or services. What industry 
is it? How large of a market do they represent? 
 
3. What is your revenue model? More simply, how do 
you expect to make money?   
 
4. Who is behind the company? “Bet on the jockey, 
not the horse” is a familiar saying among Inves-
tors. Tell them a little about you and your team’s 
background and achievements. If you have a 
strong advisory board, tell them who they are and 
what they have accomplished. 
5. Who are your competitors? Don’t have any? Think 
again. Briefly discuss who they are and what they 
have accomplished. Successful competition is an 
advantage-they are proof your business model 
and/or concept work. 
 
6. What is your competitive advantage? Simply 
being in an industry with successful competitors 
is not enough. You need to effectively communi-
cate how your company is different and why you 
have an advantage over the competitors. A better 
distribution channel? Key partners? Proprietary 
technology? 
7.3 Looking out for global scalability 
In reality, SC-investors are looking for companies that 
can position themselves for growth, because growth 
sells further up the investor-value chain. A recent 
comparative study on the Polish and Danish SC-inves-
tor community conducted under the auspices of the 
Business Model Design Center, it is found that a further 
dimension to the framework in the SC-investor screen-
ing framework in table 1 should be added, namely that 
of assessing the “Born global ability” of the company. 
Fejfer (2012) finds six aspects that must be considered 
in assessing the born global ability of a new venture: 
1. Level of global orientation
2. Existence of global competitive edge(s)
3. Level of business model scalability
4. Managerial competences
5. Strong networking competences
6. Strong learning capabilities
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